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“Dope” Dilemmas in a Budding Future 
Industry: An Examination of the Current 
Status of Marijuana Legalization in the 
United States 
Steven A. Vitale* 
This Comment provides an in-depth analysis of the current status 
regarding legalization of marijuana in the United States. It 
begins by tracing a brief history of the legalization movement in 
this country. The next section addresses the federal-state law 
conflict issue, coupled with a thorough analysis of two recent 
and relatively unexamined developments—the Department of 
Justice’s August 29, 2013 memorandum issued as a guide to 
federal prosecutors concerning marijuana law enforcement, and 
the September 10, 2013 judicial committee hearing on the 
conflict between federal and state marijuana laws. So long as the 
federal-state law conflict exists, it seems that the current climate, 
filled with uncertainty and ambiguity, allows for possible 
arbitrary abuse of power and selective prosecution by the 
federal government. A particularized focus on the current 
activities of Colorado and Washington places many of these 
issues into context, and enables us to study the progression of 
legalization in action. One section is dedicated to addressing the 
detrimental effects of current federal drug policy, and serves to 
highlight federal, state, and local reform efforts around the 
country. This newly emerging “cannabusiness” also creates 
some ethical dilemmas for lawyers seeking to aid clients in their 
business endeavors; thus, part of this Comment seeks to unpack 
these ethical quandaries and provide some clarity and guidance 
to attorneys. The role of the Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination and its potential effect on this budding and 
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lucrative industry is also closely examined. The final section 
discusses what the future of federally legalized marijuana might 
look like— how marijuana might be dealt with as a controlled 
and regulated substance in the business sector, how the law 
would handle such a shift, and what overarching effects this shift 
might have on the criminal justice system. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Marijuana legalization has been a historically controversial topic 
sparking significant public discourse in the United States. Indeed, recent 
developments have catapulted the issue to the forefront of political 
debates, legal quandaries, and business opportunities. Despite the 
proliferation of this issue, and even with a mild familiarity regarding 
some of the discussions, it can be exceedingly difficult to locate and 
understand the latest research-based information on marijuana and its 
progression on the path to legalization. Health effects, conflicts of law, 
business ethics, and legal status are all compelling tangential issues 
shrouded in uncertainty. This confusion is fueled by self-serving 
messages presented by popular culture, the media, and political agendas. 
The purpose of this Comment is to provide some level of clarity by 
first tracing a brief history of legalization in this country, with a 
particularized focus on the current activities of Colorado and 
Washington. The federal-state law conflict issue will also be addressed, 
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coupled with a thorough analysis of two recent and relatively 
unexamined developments—the Department of Justice’s August 29, 
2013 memorandum issued as a guide to federal prosecutors concerning 
marijuana law enforcement, and the September 10, 2013 judicial 
committee hearing on the conflict between federal and state marijuana 
laws. The next major section will seek to unpack the ethical dilemma 
lawyers might face in aiding clients in the newly emerging marijuana 
business, with a specialized focus on the role of the Fifth Amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination, and its potential effect on this 
budding and lucrative industry. So long as the federal-state law conflict 
exists, it seems that the current uncertain and ambiguous climate allows 
for possible arbitrary abuse of power and selective prosecution by the 
federal government. The final section will briefly address what the future 
of federally legalized marijuana might look like— how marijuana might 
be dealt with as a controlled and regulated substance in the business 
sector, how the law would handle such a shift, and what overarching 
effects this shift might have on the criminal justice system. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARIJUANA AND ITS INTRODUCTION 
TO THE UNITED STATES 
Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug in the world.1 It is 
derived from the flowering hemp plant, bearing the scientific name 
Cannabis sativa.2 Cannabis can be found in a variety of forms, but the 
most common and familiar form is marijuana.3 Its primary psychoactive 
ingredient is delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol, better known as THC, and it 
is just one of the many cannabinoids found in marijuana.4 “Different 
parts of the plant, plants of different genetic strains, and plants grown 
under different conditions contain different mixes of these chemicals,”5 
and these factors contribute to the varying potency of a particular 
specimen.6 Potency is measured by the concentration of cannabinoids— 
THC specifically—and, due to technological improvements, better 
growing methods, and selective breeding, marijuana has become 
increasingly potent over the past few decades.7 With so many varying 
                                                                                                             
1 See JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION: WHAT EVERYONE 
NEEDS TO KNOW 3 (2012). 
2 See JERROLD S. MEYER & LINDA F. QUENZER, PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY: DRUGS, THE 
BRAIN, AND BEHAVIOR 328 (1st ed. 2005). 
3 Id. 
4 See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 7. 
5 Id. at 7. 
6 Id. at 8. 
7 Id. at 9. 
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cannabis strains continually discovered and grown, and due to the variety 
of preparation methods available, the potency of marijuana is constantly 
changing, influencing both its popularity and price. 
The increase in potency over the years has been a topic of debate, but 
there has been an even greater dispute over whether or not this increased 
potency even matters. To the average consumer looking for a fix, more 
potent marijuana is preferred because a user requires less to attain the 
desired high. Smoking less pot could be additionally beneficial to the 
user in the sense that less pot equals less throat irritation, less exposure 
reduces the possibility of lung damage, and, since it takes less time to get 
high, less probability of getting caught.8 Yet, some research suggests that 
more potent pot can lead to a greater likelihood of negative effects, such 
as panic attacks and anxiety fits, unfamiliar and intense intoxicating 
sensations, a higher probability of dependency, and other health risks.9 
Marijuana has been used since ancient times as both a means for 
achieving a euphoric effect, as well as for medicinal purposes, such as 
treating pain, nausea, lack of appetite, and many other conditions. The 
oldest known written record of cannabis use comes from a Chinese 
medical compendium dating back to circa 2727 BCE.10 Apart from its 
biological, religious, and therapeutic utility, the hemp plant has many 
industrial uses. In fact, there is archeological evidence of hemp rope 
dating back between 8,000–10,000 years ago, before farming was even 
invented.11 Use of marijuana spread west to India, North Africa, and to 
the Arab world, where consumption became commonplace.12 Western 
interest in marijuana came much later, around the early to mid-nineteenth 
century, when Napoleon’s soldiers returned from Egypt with not only the 
Rosetta stone, but also the practice of smoking marijuana for recreational 
use.13 The history of cannabis in the United States dates back to the 
colonial era, when the Virginia Company commissioned domestic 
production of hemp for industrial purposes.14 The plant was an 
agricultural commodity with great economic importance to England. It 
was used to make rope, cloth, and paper. Medical use of cannabis began 
in the 1850s, when it became available in American pharmacies.15 As its 
                                                                                                             
8 See id. at 11. 
9 See id. at 11. 
10 See Cannabis, Coca, & Poppy: Nature’s Addictive Plants, DEA MUSEUM, 
http://www.deamuseum.org/ccp/cannabis/history.html [hereinafter DEA MUSEUM]. 
11 See CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 18. 
12 See DEA MUSEUM, supra note 10. 
13 See Michael Berkey, Note, Mary Jane’s New Dance: The Medical Marijuana Legal 
Tango, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 417, 420 (2011). 
14 See ROBERT DEITCH, HEMP—AMERICAN HISTORY REVISITED: THE PLANT WITH A 
DIVIDED HISTORY 16 (2003). 
15 See Berkley, supra note 13, at 420. 
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medicinal usefulness grew, efforts were made to regulate its sale, and 
pharmaceutical laws were created on a state-by-state basis. 
Use of marijuana as an intoxicant in America did not emerge until 
the early 1900s.16 
[H]istorians believe that the social practice of consuming 
cannabis (mainly marijuana smoking) was brought into 
the United States . . . by Mexican immigrants crossing 
the Mexican–American border, and by Caribbean 
seamen and West Indian immigrants entering the 
country by way of New Orleans and other ports on the 
Gulf of Mexico.17 
The history of marijuana regulation in the United States is a sad one.18 
“Marijuana in the early twentieth century was negatively associated in 
the popular consciousness with African–Americans and Mexican–
Americans, a fact directly tied to the initial movement to criminalize 
it.”19 The word “marijuana” itself is derived from the Mexican word 
maraguanquo (meaning “an intoxicating plant”).20 Hostility towards 
Mexican immigrants eventually morphed into hostility toward “what was 
thought of as a Mexican drug.”21 According to some scholars, 
marijuana’s growing popularity and use took off in the 1920s as a cheap 
and effective alternative to alcohol, which was prohibited throughout the 
county at the time.22 From 1914 to 1930, state and local governments 
began enacting anti-marijuana laws to initially regulate pharmaceutical 
products, but were later aimed at restricting and prohibiting importation, 
distribution, sale, and possession.23 
In the 1930s, the federal government initiated an anti-marijuana 
campaign, grossly exaggerating the drug’s negative effects to instill fear 
and deter use. Harry Anslinger was appointed in 1930 as the first 
Commissioner of Narcotics in the Bureau of Narcotics of the United 
States Treasury Department.24 “He spear-headed a public relations 
                                                                                                             
16 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 19. 
17 MEYER & QUENZER, supra note 2, at 329. 
18 Sam Kamin & Eli Wald, Marijuana Lawyers: Outlaws or Crusaders?, 91 OR. L. 
REV. 869, 872 (2013). 
19 Id. 
20 MEYER & QUENZER, supra note 2, at 328. 
21 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 19. 
22 LYNN ZIMMER, CHAPTER ONE: THE HISTORY OF CANNABIS PROHIBITION 2, available 
at http://www.bisdro.uni-bremen.de/boellinger/cannabis/03-zimme.pdf (last visited Oct. 
5, 2014). 
23 See id. 
24 MEYER & QUENZER, supra note 2, at 327. 
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campaign to portray marijuana as a social menace capable of destroying 
the youth of America.”25 During this period, the government was feeding 
misinformation to the media, resulting in a stream of propaganda 
warning about the evils of marijuana use. Magazine and news articles 
with titles like “Marihuana: Assassin of Youth” and “Sex Crazing Drug 
Menace” permeated society.26 Anti-marijuana movies such as Reefer 
Madness, which seems to artistically portray the conflicting duality of 
progress and degeneration, acted rather as a cautionary tale to the 
children of the country and to any other would-be users. The 
government’s anti-marijuana campaign culminated in the passage of the 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, which effectively made possession and 
transfer of the drug as an intoxicant illegal throughout the United States 
under federal law.27 “In congressional hearings that preceded passage of 
[the Act], Anslinger testified [that] ‘those who are habitually accustomed 
to use of the drug are said to develop a delirious rage after its 
administration, during which they are temporarily, at least, irresponsible 
and liable to commit violent crimes.’”28 
Although Anslinger’s zealous advocacy was a strong impetus for 
federal anti-marijuana legislation, he should not be given full credit for 
creating the “anti-marijuana consensus.”29 Its origin can be traced back 
to before the introduction of marijuana into American culture. The 
sentiment is deeply rooted in the country, exemplified by the founding of 
the American temperance movement, whose members “were particularly 
concerned with the detrimental effects of alcohol and drugs on their own 
families and communities”30 and sought to restrict and abolish the use of 
intoxicating substances. By 1942, cannabis was removed from the 
Pharmacopoeia, the nation’s official list of approved pharmaceutical 
substances.31 In 1951, the Boggs Act was passed by Congress, labeling 
cannabis as a “narcotic” and establishing minimum sentencing guidelines 
for marijuana-related offenses.32 Despite continued regulation and harsh 
penalties, marijuana remained widely used and was embraced by the 
counterculture movement of the 1960s.33 
                                                                                                             
25 Id. at 327. 
26 Id. at 328. 
27 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 19. 
28 MEYER & QUENZER, supra note 2, at 327. 
29 ZIMMER, supra note 22, at 3. 
30 Id. at 3. 
31 REP. EARL BLUMENAUR & REP. JARED POLIS, THE PATH FORWARD: RETHINKING 
FEDERAL MARIJUANA POLICY 4 (2013), available at http://polis.house.gov/uploadedfiles
/the_path_forward.pdf [hereinafter THE PATH FORWARD]. 
32 Boggs Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-235, 65 Stat. 767 (repealed 1970). 
33 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 19. 
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In the landmark case of Leary v. United States, the Supreme Court 
determined that the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was unconstitutional 
because it violated the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.34 The Court held that the statute compelled the petitioner 
to expose himself to the risk of self-incrimination by requiring him to 
identify himself in the course of obtaining an order form as an 
unregistered transferee who had paid the occupational tax.35 The 
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937 was repealed, but President Nixon urged 
Congress to “get tough” on drugs,36 in response to what “many saw as 
the self-indulgent excesses of the 1960s.”37 
As a result, the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act was passed in 1970, which included the Controlled Substances Act, 
the prevailing federal regulatory scheme to this day. The Act created a 
scheduling system and classified marijuana as a Schedule I drug along 
with heroin and LSD.38 Schedule I drugs are classified as such due to 
their potential for abuse and lack of approved medical uses39 The Act 
also authorized the creation of a National Commission on Marijuana and 
Drug Abuse.40 Raymond Shafer was appointed as chairman and formed 
what would later become known as the “Shafer Commission.”41 The 
commission issued a report in 1972 entitled Marijuana: A Signal of 
Misunderstanding, which concluded that “neither the marijuana user nor 
the drug itself can be said to constitute a danger to public safety”42 and 
recommended the “decriminalization of possession of marijuana for 
personal use on both the state and federal level.”43 Naturally, the report 
drew immediate and fierce opposition from the Nixon administration and 
was strongly criticized.44 Its publication, however, indicated the 
continuing shift of “elite opinion,”45 and sparked a movement among the 
states to decriminalize possession of marijuana and reduce associated 
penalties. 
The decriminalization movement began in Oregon in 1973, when the 
state passed legislation that reduced the penalty for possession of small 
                                                                                                             
34 Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1970). 
35 Id. at 20. 
36 Kamin & Wald, supra note 18, at 873. 
37 Id. at 873. 
38 See Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 812 (2012). 
39 Id. 
40 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 20. 
41 Id. at 20. 
42 Patrick K. Nightingale, A Brief History of Marijuana in the United States and a 
Case for Legalization in Pennsylvania, PITTSBURGH NORML. 
43 Id. 
44 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 21. 
45 Id. at 21. 
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amounts of marijuana to a simple fine.46 In the next few years, several 
more states including Colorado, Alaska, Ohio, and California had 
similarly passed laws decriminalizing possession of small amounts of 
cannabis, reducing the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor and 
lowering the accompanying penalties.47 “With the advent of the Reagan 
administration [however], the 1980s saw increasing levels of anti-
marijuana rhetoric.”48 During this resurgence of prohibitionist fervor, 
many states reinstated imprisonment for possession, and arrests for 
marijuana-related offenses were on the rise.49 
Despite such opposition, marijuana usage nearly doubled in the early 
to mid-1990s.50 The next major transition occurred in 1996, when 
California legalized the sale and use of medical marijuana with the 
passage of Proposition 215 (the Compassionate Use Act).51 Since that 
time, the medical marijuana movement has gained momentum; currently 
twenty-three states and the District of Colombia have adopted programs 
and enacted laws removing criminal sanctions for the medical use of 
marijuana in order to treat a myriad of illnesses and conditions.52 These 
states, however, approach the permissible use of medical marijuana in 
significantly diverse ways, creating a kaleidoscope of regulatory 
schemes. This makes it well-nigh impossible for the emerging business 
model to navigate, especially taking into account the conflict of state and 
federal approaches to the drug. 
The federal government’s adamant refusal to either reschedule 
marijuana under the Controlled Substances Act, or craft legislation to 
better manage this acute state-federal conflict, leaves an intolerable 
tension wherein law enforcement resources are not efficiently allocated, 
and the opportunity for individual states to garner much-needed tax 
revenue is squandered. With complete legalization fully implemented in 
Colorado and Washington, the current political climate allows for 
possible arbitrary abuse of power and selective prosecution by the federal 
                                                                                                             
46 See OR. REV. STAT. § 475.864(3)(c) (which incorporates the decriminalizing 
language of the 1973 legislation). 
47 For an example of such state legislation, see CAL. STATE OFFICE OF NARCOTICS AND 
DRUG ABUSE, A FIRST REPORT OF THE IMPACT OF CALIFORNIA’S NEW MARIJUANA LAW, 
SB 95, Appendix I (1977), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization
/45532NCJRS.pdf. 
48 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. 
49 Zimmer, supra note 22, at 8. 
50 CAULKINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 22. 
51 See Compassionate Use Act of 1996, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 
(West 1996). 
52 23 Legal Medical Marijuana States and DC, PROCON.ORG, 
http://medicalmarijuana.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000881 (last updated 
July 31, 2014). 
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government. What remains is an unfair and unequal application of 
justice. Perhaps it is time for the government to recognize when the 
existing mechanisms no longer work and the status quo must be changed. 
II. THE FEDERALISM ISSUE 
State laws occasionally conflicting with federal laws have been a 
continuing and inevitable feature of the American federalist system. The 
aforementioned Controlled Substances Act is the current regulatory 
regime in place today regarding federal enforcement of marijuana laws. 
However, twenty three states and the District of Colombia have enacted 
laws decriminalizing possession and the use of medical marijuana 
despite the fact that the Drug Enforcement Agency (“DEA”) still 
classifies marijuana as a Schedule I drug. These states and their residents 
are in direct conflict with federal regulations, and the marijuana issue 
continues to engender both confusion and outright conflict. In recent 
years, various efforts were made by states to legalize marijuana for 
recreational use. California’s Proposition 19 (2010) and Oregon’s 
Measure 80 (2012) came close to being passed by voters.53 Then in the 
fall of 2012, Colorado and Washington became the first states to pass 
voter initiatives legalizing the sale and possession of marijuana for 
recreational use.54 
“[The] interplay between state and federal law has prompted a 
unique legal result,”55 where federal prohibition and state exemption 
coexist with one another. Pursuant to the statutory framework of the 
Controlled Substances Act, cultivation, distribution, or possession of 
marijuana is a federal crime.56 The Supreme Court has determined that 
                                                                                                             
53 See California Secretary of State, Proposition 19: Legalize Marijuana in CA, 
Regulate and Tax, (Jan. 5, 2011, 12:58 PM), http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2010-
general/maps/prop-19.htm (California’s Proposition 19 was defeated 53.5% to 46.5%.); 
see also Oregon 2012 Election Results, OREGONLIVE (Nov. 9, 2012, 10:14 AM), 
http://gov.oregonlive.com/election/2012/Map/Measure-80/ (Oregon’s Measure 80 was 
defeated 54% to 46%.). 
54 See Amendment 64: Legalize Marijuana Election Results, DENVER POST (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://data.denverpost.com/election/results/amendment/2012/64-legalize-
marijuana/ (Colorado’s Amendment 64 passed with 54.8% of the vote.); see also 
Washington Secretary of State, Initiative Measure No. 502 Concerns Marijuana, (Nov. 
27, 2012, 4:55 PM), http://vote.wa.gov/results/20121106/Initiative-Measure-No-502-
Concerns-marijuana.html (Washington’s Initiative 502 passed with 55.7% of the vote.). 
55 TODD GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE 
SUPREMACY CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL 
LAW 16 (2012). 
56 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (2012). 
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Congress has the power to enact federal prohibitions on marijuana.57 
However, “even if the federal government sought to preempt state 
marijuana laws, its power to do so is inherently limited.”58 Principles of 
federalism, such as the limitations of the Tenth Amendment and state 
sovereignty, prevent the federal government from compelling states to 
participate in enforcing a federal regulatory scheme, and prohibit it from 
commandeering state legislatures and executive officers to act as a 
conduit for implementation and enforcement of federal law.59 However, 
under the Supremacy Clause, state laws conflicting with federal law are 
generally preempted and therefore invalid because “the Constitution, and 
the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land.”60 Despite this, in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., the Court 
makes clear that there is a presumption against federal preemption, 
noting that “we start with the assumption that the historic police powers 
of the States [are] not to be superseded.”61 The courts have generally 
accorded this presumption to states’ medical marijuana laws, and have 
viewed the relationship between federal and state marijuana laws in a 
different manner. 
Preemption is divided into three general classes: express preemption, 
conflict preemption, and field preemption.62 Determining the issue of 
preemption requires an analysis of congressional intent. Express 
preemption is self-explanatory: the statutory language will explicitly 
state the degree of preemption in some cases, but preemption can also be 
implied in two circumstances. “[U]nder conflict preemption, a state law 
is preempted ‘where compliance with both federal law and state 
regulation is a physical impossibility . . . or where state law stands as an 
obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and 
objectives of Congress.’”63 Field preemption is the second implied 
situation, and occurs when a federal regulatory scheme is so 
                                                                                                             
57 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
58 Kamin & Wald, supra note 18, at 880. 
59 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or 
administer a federal regulatory program.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 
(1997) (“[T]he Federal Government may not compel the States to implement, by 
legislation or executive action, federal regulatory programs.”). 
60 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
61 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). 
62 See generally Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001); Florida Lime 
and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); see also Hines v. Davidowitz, 
312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941) (“But none of these expressions provides an infallible 
constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick.”). 
63 Garvey, supra note 55, at 8 (citing Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt Ass’n., 505 
U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal citations omitted)). 
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comprehensive that a reasonable inference could be drawn that Congress 
“left no room for the States to supplement it.”64 Looking to the language 
of the Controlled Substances Act reveals Congress’ preemptive intent in 
regard to the relationship between federal and state marijuana laws. 
Section 903 of the Act states: 
No provision of this subchapter shall be construed as 
indicating an intent on the part of the Congress to 
occupy the field in which that provision operates, 
including criminal penalties, to the exclusion of any 
State law on the same subject matter which would 
otherwise be within the authority of the State, unless 
there is a positive conflict between that provision of this 
subchapter and that State law so that the two cannot 
consistently stand together.65 
On its face, Section 903 rejects the idea that the Controlled Substances 
Act creates any congressional intent to freeze states out of legislating in 
this area, except in the instance of a “positive conflict,” which renders 
federal and state law incompatible with one another. Furthermore, the 
emphasized portion of Section 903 acts as a reserve clause for the federal 
government to retain effective enforcement power. Yet, the evolution of 
state regulations has made determining what constitutes such a conflict 
exceedingly difficult, and courts have reached starkly different results. 
The bulk of preemption challenges have fallen short when it comes 
to state medical marijuana exemptions, and some states have taken such 
successes and attempted to push the boundaries of the preemption 
doctrine. Moving beyond “merely exempting qualified individuals from 
prosecution under state drug laws,”66 some states have attempted to 
explicitly allow and regulate medical marijuana use. California, for 
instance, passed the Medical Marijuana Program Act, seeking to increase 
state control over the use of marijuana within its jurisdiction.67 The Act 
required proof of registration in the form of I.D. cards issued to patients 
and caregivers who were legally qualified.68 The registration and 
identification card provisions were sustained by a California appellate 
court, which found that the specific provisions at issue did not rise to a 
                                                                                                             
64 Garvey, supra note 55, at 9 (citing Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230). 
65 Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. § 903 (2012) (emphasis added). 
66 Garvey, supra note 55, at 11. 
67 See Medical Marijuana Program Act of 2003, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 
§§ 11362.7 – 11362.9 (West 2003). 
68 See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.71(a)(1), (b)(5). 
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positive conflict and thus were not preempted by Section 903 of the 
Controlled Substances Act.69 
In direct contrast, a court in Oregon held that similar registration and 
identification card provisions of the Oregon Medical Marijuana Act rose 
to the level of a “positive conflict,” and was therefore preempted by the 
Controlled Substances Act.70 The takeaway from these two examples 
reveals a distorted landscape, in which different state courts employ 
diverging legal interpretations. These types of nuanced distinctions 
exemplify the larger context of marijuana legalization. Such a confusing 
legal climate creates an atmosphere of uncertainty and raises several 
constitutional queries and countless complications. 
Notwithstanding the numerous unresolved issues surrounding 
preemption, other questions inevitably emerge. To what degree will the 
federal government enforce federal law in states that have legalized 
marijuana under state regulatory schemes? With so much confusion and 
uncertainty as regulations continue to change and conflict, how will the 
federal government identify and deal with the black market for 
marijuana, which poses a serious challenge to law enforcement as it 
seeks to apply existing drug policies?71 
Despite their operation in the medical market, dispensaries in 
California, Washington, and Montana have been the recent victims of 
federal raids. In 2011, twenty-six Montana dispensaries that were 
“seemingly compliant with state law”72 were raided. The raids seemed to 
send a clear message—the federal government intends to enforce the 
Controlled Substances Act and prohibit marijuana distribution.73 Then in 
July 2013, the DEA raided four dispensaries in Washington, the first 
major raid on marijuana retailers in the state since voters passed 
Initiative 502, which legalized small amounts of marijuana for 
recreational use.74 This string of seemingly arbitrary enforcement by the 
federal government stifles legitimate business, impairs access for 
medical usage, and results in a conflict that creates a constitutional 
conundrum, pitting the right of state voters to choose how they live 
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according to local community standards against the federal government’s 
power to preempt state law under the Supremacy Clause.75 
The doctrine of prosecutorial discretion enables the federal 
government to exercise broad discretionary power “as to when, whom, 
and whether to prosecute for violations of federal law.”76 Courts have 
recognized this power of the executive branch, and have deemed it 
“particularly ill-suited to judicial review,”77 for it includes factors “not 
readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to 
undertake.”78 Prosecutorial discretion, although broad, is still subject to a 
few limitations such as the Equal Protection Clause.79 The decision to 
prosecute must not be based on “an unjustifiable standard such as race, 
religion, or other arbitrary classification.”80 So long as the prosecutor’s 
decision to move forward on a case does not have an underlying 
discriminatory purpose, he is free to prosecute any individual or 
organization that violates federal law, including the Controlled 
Substances Act. Utilizing its own investigative and prosecutorial 
resources, the federal government can bring charges against anyone who 
produces, possesses, or distributes marijuana, regardless of their 
compliance with state law. To clarify its position and power, the 
Department of Justice crafted memoranda in 2009 and 2011 to guide 
federal prosecutors with the enforcement of federal marijuana laws.81 
However, recent developments on the marijuana frontier, particularly the 
legalization of marijuana for recreational use by Colorado and 
Washington, have obligated the Department of Justice to act once again. 
“In light of state ballot initiatives that legalize under state law the 
possession of small amounts of marijuana and provide for the regulation 
of marijuana production, processing, and sale,”82 the Department of 
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Justice (“DOJ”) issued a memorandum on August 29, 2013, to give 
guidance once again to federal prosecutors on marijuana law 
enforcement under the Controlled Substances Act. The DOJ reaffirmed 
its determination “that marijuana is a dangerous drug and that the illegal 
distribution and sale of marijuana is a serious crime that provides a 
significant source of revenue to large scale criminal enterprises.”83 
Enforcing the Controlled Substances Act and utilizing the federal 
government’s limited resources “to address the most significant threats in 
the most effective, consistent, and rational way”84 remains the primary 
focus of the DOJ. In guiding federal prosecutors in the enforcement of 
the Controlled Substances Act, the DOJ has provided a list of priorities 
that are of particular importance to the federal government: 
- Preventing the distribution of marijuana to 
minors; 
- Preventing revenue from the sale of marijuana 
from going to criminal enterprises, gangs, and cartels; 
- Preventing the diversion of marijuana from 
states where it is legal under state law in some form to 
other states; 
- Preventing state-authorized marijuana activity 
from being used as a cover or pretext for the trafficking 
of other illegal drugs or other illegal activity; 
- Preventing violence and the use of firearms in 
the cultivation and distribution of marijuana; 
- Preventing drugged driving and the exacerbation 
of other adverse public health consequences associated 
with marijuana use; 
- Preventing the growing of marijuana on public 
lands and the attendant public safety and environmental 
dangers posed by marijuana production on public lands; 
and 
- Preventing marijuana possession or use on 
federal property.85 
                                                                                                             
83 Id. at 1. 
84 Id. 
85 Id. at 1-2. 
2014] "DOPE" DILEMMAS IN A BUDDING FUTURE INDUSTRY 145 
 
The department urged that enforcement resources and efforts focus on 
activity that affects any one or more of these priorities. Outside of these 
enumerated interests, the federal government has typically relied on, and 
will continue to rely on, state and local law enforcement agencies to deal 
with marijuana-related activities and offenses via their own narcotics 
laws.86 
This traditional joint effort between federal and state approaches to 
drug policies is now precarious due to the recent passage of Colorado 
and Washington marijuana laws and regulatory schemes. Sam Kamin, 
Professor of Law at University of Denver Sturm College of Law, has 
made numerous contributions to the issue of marijuana legalization. In a 
recent essay, Kamin advocates for an ideal of cooperative federalism, 
where he proposes an amendment to the Controlled Substances Act that 
would allow states to opt-out of the Act’s marijuana provisions.87 Such a 
model, according to Kamin, would enable states “to function as 
laboratories for new ideas with regard to marijuana regulation and 
taxation.”88 This Comment argues that the model could defuse federal-
state tensions, and allow the emerging marijuana industry to naturally 
establish efficient market conditions within the framework of a rational 
regulatory system. Unfortunately, Congress has made no indication that 
it would amend the Controlled Substances Act by including such an opt-
out clause, and states are forced to operate in this legally gray area. 
The proliferation of possibilities related to marijuana legislation at 
both the state and federal levels creates an atmosphere of uncertainty. 
The DOJ has emphasized its expectation that the states formulate robust 
regulation and enforcement systems that prove to be strong and effective, 
not just on paper, but in practice.89 So long as these systems effectively 
control the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana, 
the federal priorities listed remain less likely to be threatened.90 If these 
systems fail to protect against the harms set forth above, then the federal 
government reserves the right to challenge the state’s regulatory 
structure, and continue to prosecute individuals and organizations alike 
in violation of federal law.91 
In exercising prosecutorial discretion, federal prosecutors are to take 
a number of factors into consideration including, but not limited to, the 
size and commercial nature of the marijuana enterprise, and the 
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operation’s compliance with state laws and regulations.92 However, 
“[t]he primary question in all cases—and in all jurisdictions—should be 
whether the conduct at issue implicates one or more of the enforcement 
priorities”93 annunciated in the 2013 memorandum. The DOJ concludes 
with the disclaimer that the federal government retains the authority to 
enforce any and all federal laws regardless of state law, even in the 
absence of any one of the factors aforementioned.94 The memo notes that 
nothing in this memorandum provides a legal defense to a violation of 
federal law, and that “[t]his memorandum is not intended to, does not, 
and may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or 
procedural, enforceable at law by any party in any matter civil or 
criminal.”95 Overall, “the decision to limit prosecutions appears to be 
based on enforcement priorities and the allocation of resources,”96 and, in 
exercising its prosecutorial discretion, the DOJ is under no obligation to 
prosecute all violations of federal law.97 
Just days after the issuance of the DOJ’s August 29, 2013 
memorandum, the Senate conducted a congressional hearing to discuss 
the state and federal marijuana laws conflict. Kevin Sabet, current 
director of project SAM (“Smart Approaches to Marijuana”) and former 
senior drug policy advisor to the Obama Administration, was one of the 
first to speak to the Senate Judicial Committee. After quickly observing 
the niceties, Sabet delved into the crux of his speech, remarking that he 
“found the recent guidance by the U.S. Deputy Attorney General [(Cole 
Memo 2013)] disturbing on both legal and policy grounds.”98 Sabet 
believes that by issuing this particular guidance, the DOJ has deferred its 
right to challenge and preempt state marijuana laws, as well as 
disregarded the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act and other 
policies aimed at protecting public health and safety.99 However, Sabet 
underemphasizes the DOJ’s recognizable attempt to reserve enforcement 
power in its memorandum, as well as the reserving language in Section 
903 of the Controlled Substances Act. Sabet fears that the “new guidance 
endangers Americans since it will facilitate the creation of a large 
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industry for marijuana use, production, trafficking, and sale.”100 He 
commended the Controlled Substances Act for its purpose to promote 
public health, and how it has been an effective tool used to target drug 
traffickers and producers.101 But now, according to Sabet, the DOJ has 
given its stamp of federal approval to the states of Colorado and 
Washington to go ahead and “start a massive for-profit, commercial 
industry for marijuana.”102 
The next major segment of Sabet’s speech was devoted to addressing 
some of the priorities listed in the DOJ’s memorandum, and how these 
federal interests have already been compromised. He pointed out how the 
DOJ claims to be concerned with minors’ access to marijuana; yet, 
according to Sabet, from the time marijuana was legalized for medical 
use, minors have been exposed to the drug in larger numbers than ever 
before, there has been an increase in unintentional marijuana poisonings 
among children, and “peer-reviewed papers are finding that medical 
marijuana is [being] easily diverted to youth.”103 Sabet condemned 
Colorado for its “mass advertising, promotion,”104 and usage of items 
that are attractive to kids—”like ‘medical marijuana lollipops,’ ‘Ring 
Pots,’ and ‘Pot-Tarts.’”105 Although, it is not unheard of to disguise 
medicine for children in order to get them to take it or to alter their 
perception of treatment. Examples range from a mother waving a spoon-
full of cough syrup around like an airplane, to the A.C. Camargo Cancer 
Center that disguises chemotherapy treatment for children as superhero 
formula.106 A young child suffering from something like undifferentiated 
soft tissue sarcoma, a rare but aggressive form of cancer, may be more 
inclined to ingest medical marijuana in the form of a lozenge or lollipop 
to ease intense pain, when morphine has proven ineffective and only 
continues to cause severe nausea. The very nature of marijuana as a legal 
business lends itself to all the trappings of any normal business, 
including advertising aimed at glamorizing a product or service. This is a 
relatively standard model, and sometimes citizens have to deal with all 
the consequences of living in a capitalistic society that espouses profit 
over moral sensibility. 
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That being said, the federal government has restricted advertising of 
certain industries (specifically the area of tobacco), and has tightly 
regulated others (such as alcohol). Sabet, however, closed with a section 
entitled “experience shows that ‘Regulation’ is anything but.”107 He 
referenced two independent reports by the Colorado State Auditor, where 
both suggest that the newly implemented regulatory system is not well 
regulated at all.108 Yet, there are some who believe that this regulatory 
system is only in the infancy stage of development and needs time to 
grow and adapt. Colorado has dealt with a legal marijuana industry for 
more than a decade, and according to Paul Armentano, Deputy Director 
of NORML (National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Law), 
“[w]e’ve been told that the reason we can’t change [marijuana policy] is 
because if we do, the sky will fall,” but “[t]he sky is not falling in 
Colorado. People that live in Colorado recognize that, and people outside 
of Colorado will recognize that as well.”109 
The September 10, 2013 judicial committee heard from several other 
prominent figures directly involved in the marijuana legalization issue 
and who are dealing with the complex questions arising. James Cole, 
Deputy Attorney General of the United States Department of Justice, 
defended his position in the August 29, 2013, memorandum issued as a 
guide to federal prosecutors all over the nation.110 He reiterated the list of 
federal enforcement priorities and emphasized cooperation between 
federal and state law enforcement efforts in the area of drug policy.111 He 
clarified that the DOJ reserves its right to challenge any state law or 
regulatory scheme, despite that the duty of developing comprehensive 
laws and well-funded regulation systems falls to the states.112 The next 
few speakers—Patrick Leahy, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee; John Urquhart, Sheriff of King County Seattle, Washington; 
and Jack Finlaw, Chief Legal Counsel for the Office of Colorado 
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Governor John W. Hickenlooper—all highlighted two significant federal 
obstacles to effective state implementation and regulation of marijuana—
existing federal law in the areas of banking and taxation. 
Sheriff Urquhart pointed out that “under federal law, it is illegal for 
banks to open checking, savings, or credit card accounts for marijuana 
businesses. The result is that marijuana stores will be operated as cash-
only businesses, creating two big problems.”113 In terms of public safety, 
these businesses become targets for criminal activity. Regulation and 
enforcement issues also arise with cash-only businesses because it is 
“more difficult to account for and track revenues and audit tax payments 
of businesses that do not use financial institutions.”114 However, as of 
February 14, 2014, the Obama administration, via the Department of the 
Treasury, has issued guidance to the banking industry regarding how to 
conduct business with these state-legal marijuana industries.115 This is a 
potentially major step toward legitimization and could eliminate one of 
the main hurdles preventing effective implementation and regulation. 
Budding entrepreneurs may now be able to utilize the federal banking 
system and achieve some level of financial stability and economic 
certainty, enabling them to deploy and test their business models more 
effectively. 
In the February 14, 2014 guidance, the Financial Crimes 
Enforcement Network attempted to clarify the Bank Secrecy Act and the 
rules for banks providing financial services to marijuana businesses.116 
The banks will be required to assess several factors based on their 
individual institutional objectives, the associated risks, and their ability 
to manage such risks effectively when providing financial services.117 
They are to notify federal regulators of any suspicious activity by filing a 
Suspicious Activity Report (“SAR”), despite any state law that legalizes 
marijuana.118 Financial institutions will also be required to file what is 
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called a “Marijuana Limited” SAR report when the institution reasonably 
believes that the marijuana-related business “does not implicate one of 
the Cole Memo priorities or violate state law.”119 The financial 
institution should file a more comprehensive “Marijuana Priority” SAR 
report when it does reasonably believe that one or more of the Cole 
Memo priorities have been implicated, or state law has been violated.120 
Despite potentially lucrative rewards for participation ($2.57 billion in 
marijuana sales expected this year),121 and despite the Department of 
Justice directing federal prosecutors not to pursue financial institutions 
that do business with legal marijuana industries,122 problems still exist. 
Some banks still harbor a fear that, by accepting money from a business 
involved in activity considered illegal under federal law, they run the risk 
of violating money-laundering statutes.123 Also, this new guidance does 
not protect banks from the threat of future prosecution in the event that a 
new administration decides to flip the switch and prosecute these 
violations of federal drug laws. Doing business with marijuana dealers 
now may result in the banks painting a target on their backs, attracting 
the unwanted attention of the federal government. 
The Colorado Bankers Association (CBA) was quick to recognize 
this reality and released a statement immediately following the DOJ and 
the Department of Treasury’s guidance to financial institutions. “The 
guidance issued today . . . only reinforces and reiterates that banks can be 
prosecuted for providing accounts to marijuana related businesses.”124 
The CBA goes on to say that this guidance is only a modified reporting 
system and places a heavy burden on banks to know and control their 
customers’ activities.125 It is a situation where the CBA believes that “no 
bank can comply.”126 There is currently a bipartisan House bill 
circulating called the Marijuana Businesses Access to Banking Act, 
which aims to create protections for depository institutions (e.g., banks, 
credit unions, etc.) that provide financial services to marijuana-related 
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businesses.127 The bill was referred for committee review on July 10, 
2013128; unfortunately, it has a small chance of getting through the 
committee, and an even smaller chance of being enacted. In truth, as long 
as marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug and no legal clearance is 
provided to remove the threat of future federal prosecution, “bank[s] will 
remain reluctant to do business with dealers, even if they are operating 
within the confines of state laws.”129 
In regard to the taxation problem, Jack Finlaw discussed Section 
280E of the Internal Revenue Code, which “prohibits a business 
considered to be trafficking substances under the Controlled Substances 
Act from claiming any tax deductions on their federal tax returns.”130 
This provision effectively bars legally operating marijuana businesses in 
Colorado from receiving the same kind of tax breaks that other legal 
businesses enjoy. In order to address this tax issue and provide some 
assistance to the marijuana businesses, Colorado has enacted legislation 
to allow for a state income tax deduction, where “owners of medical and 
recreational marijuana businesses [will be able] to deduct their business 
expenses from their state income tax returns even though they cannot do 
so on their federal income tax returns.”131 
IV. A CLOSER LOOK AT COLORADO AND WASHINGTON 
A. Colorado’s Amendment 64  
Jack Finlaw, as Chief Legal Counsel to Colorado’s Governor, is 
uniquely positioned to provide insight into the implementation, 
enactment, and promulgation of Colorado’s new marijuana laws, 
enabling legislation, and regulatory system. In his address to the Judicial 
Committee, he discussed the passage of Amendment 64 in November 
2012.132 It became law a month later, codified as Article XVIII, Section 
16 in the Colorado Constitution, which states that 
in the interest of the efficient use of law enforcement 
resources, enhancing revenue for public purposes, and 
individual freedom, the people of Colorado find and 
declare that the use of marijuana should be legal for 
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persons twenty-one years of age or older and taxed in a 
manner similar to alcohol.133 
The statute allows for adults, ages twenty-one and older, to possess, 
purchase, use, and transport up to one ounce of marijuana, and also 
allows for the personal home growth of up to six marijuana plants.134 
Restrictions on home grows stipulate that growing must be “in an 
enclosed, locked space, is not conducted openly or publicly, and is not 
made available for sale,”135 although Finlaw points out that up to an 
ounce can be gifted to another adult twenty-one years of age or older.136 
Section 16 goes on to lay out what constitutes lawful operation of 
marijuana-related facilities,137 and mandates the implementation of 
procedures for the “issuance, renewal, suspension, and revocation of a 
license to operate a marijuana establishment,”138 as well as a regulatory 
system for the “cultivation, harvesting, processing, packaging, display, 
and sale of marijuana.”139 The statute contains a provision aimed at 
protecting the privacy of individuals: 
The department shall not require a consumer to provide a 
retail marijuana store with personal information other 
than government-issued identification to determine the 
consumer’s age, and a retail marijuana store shall not be 
required to acquire and record personal information 
about consumers other than information typically in a 
financial transaction conducted at a retail liquor store.140 
Furthermore, the statute “permits local governments in Colorado to 
regulate the time, place, manner, and number of marijuana 
establishments in their communities.”141 These local governments have 
the power to ban marijuana establishments within their jurisdiction.142 
However, if a locality opts-in, then it not only gets to take part in a tax 
share-back scheme (i.e. as the state collects taxes from marijuana-related 
businesses, it must “share-back” a certain percentage with the local 
authorities), it also has the ability to levy a locality tax, thus generating 
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more revenue.143 Employers in the state are still able to have restrictive 
policies regarding the use and possession of marijuana by employees,144 
and property owners may prohibit or regulate “possession, consumption, 
use, display, transfer, distribution, sale, transportation, or growing of 
marijuana on or in that property.”145 The statute also authorizes “the 
cultivation, processing and sale of industrial hemp,”146 and mandates that 
an excise tax not to exceed fifteen percent (15%), and a sales tax of ten 
percent (10%), be imposed on marijuana sold or transferred by 
businesses.147 The “first forty million dollars in revenue raised annually 
from any such excise tax shall be credited to the Public School Capital 
Construction Assistance Fund . . . or any successor fund dedicated to a 
similar purpose.”148 The purpose of this tax regime is to ensure that 
Colorado has the necessary financial resources available for executing a 
robust regulatory and enforcement system, as well as “for an effective 
education and prevention program to protect youth . . . and for the health 
and public safety costs associated with the retail marijuana industry.”149 
During the implementation process, a special task force co-chaired 
by Jack Finlaw and Barbara Brohl, Executive Director of the Department 
of Revenue, was commissioned to deal with and resolve any legal, 
policy, or procedural issues likely to arise.150 The task force was 
composed of a diverse group of representatives, who focused on devising 
a regulatory framework, working with local authorities, dealing with tax, 
funding, and civil law matters, while helping to develop consumer safety 
and criminal laws.151 Enabling legislation was also created during this 
period to buttress Amendment 64—bills were drafted to address retail 
stores, tax deductions, drugged driving, and the regulation of industrial 
hemp.152 The Department of Revenue performed extensive work in a 
short timeframe to develop comprehensive rules and regulations 
governing retail marijuana establishments and medical marijuana 
businesses, tackling issues like “Licensing, Licensed Premises, 
Transportation, and Storage; Licensed Entities and Inventory Tracking; 
Record Keeping, Enforcement and Discipline; Labeling, Packaging, 
Product Safety & Marketing; and Medical Differentiation.”153 The 401-
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page Permanent Rules Relating to the Colorado Retail Marijuana Code154 
is the manifestation of Colorado’s guiding principle throughout the 
whole process—”to create a robust regulatory and enforcement 
environment that protects public safety and prevents diversion of Retail 
Marijuana to individuals under the age of 21 or to individuals outside the 
state of Colorado.”155 
Colorado’s system, however, is not perfect. Seven months after 
legalization, the state has encountered some unexpected problems. The 
Colorado Department of Revenue points to the lower-taxed medical 
marijuana market as the cause for some disappointing revenue figures in 
Fiscal Year 2014.156 This illustrates the difficulty of forecasting revenue 
and other economic effects of marijuana legalization. Colorado has also 
faced several state law enforcement challenges. The numerosity and 
complexity of these issues could be the subject of a separate article, but it 
is important to highlight a few that warrant special attention. Three 
particular issues have given state law enforcement much difficulty—the 
definition and application of the “open and public consumption” policy, 
drugged driving, and the “home-grow grey market.”157 Other important 
enforcement issues include: “licensing, background checks for owners 
and employees of marijuana-related businesses, employee rights, 
addiction in the context of family law, enforcement of marijuana-related 
contracts, cultivation-practices, potency limits, labeling, advertising, and 
online sales.”158 Despite these formidable challenges, Colorado is 
seemingly fulfilling the federalist ideal, and serving as a laboratory for 
novel social and economic ideas. If its health, public safety, and 
education initiatives are ultimately effective, Colorado could show the 
rest of the nation that legalization can yield positive results. 
B. Washington’s Initiative 502 
Colorado’s efforts to implement laws and create a regulatory 
framework in the marijuana legalization movement have served as a 
model for marijuana advocates around the country. The state of 
Washington and its representatives have worked closely with Colorado 
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to become the only other state to legalize and regulate the use and sale of 
recreational marijuana. The citizens of Washington passed Initiative 502 
in November 2012.159 The new Washington marijuana laws mirror those 
of Colorado in many respects. Adults (ages 21 and older) are now 
allowed to possess up to one ounce of marijuana for personal use in both 
states.160 Washington has also adopted a similar approach to the issue of 
drugged driving: 
the department shall suspend, revoke, or deny the 
arrested person’s license, permit, or privilege to 
drive . . . [i]n the case of an incident where a person has 
submitted to or been administered a test or tests 
indicating that the alcohol concentration of the person’s 
breath or blood was 0.08 or more, or that the THC 
concentration of the person’s blood was 5.00 or more.161 
There are some notable differences however. Washington laws seem 
to be a little less liberal, and do not allow for home grows or personal 
production of any kind related to recreational use. The taxes 
implemented in Washington will be somewhat higher, with a state excise 
tax equal to twenty-five percent (25%) imposed on three separate 
transactions—the sale of marijuana from the producer to the processor, 
from processor to retailer, and from retailer to consumer.162 
Washington’s tax structure could run the risk of driving experienced and 
inexperienced users to search for cheaper prices elsewhere. Such a 
taxation scheme could spawn a potential growth in sales of marijuana on 
the black market, ultimately undermining Washington’s highest 
priority—to promote public health and safety.163 The industry structure 
in Washington also differs. While Colorado has a vertically integrated 
market, such a market is not envisioned for Washington.164 Initiative 502 
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directed Washington’s Liquor Control Board to draft and enforce the 
rules and regulations governing implementation.165 The commercial 
market in Colorado, however, is supervised and regulated by the newly 
created Marijuana Enforcement Division of the Department of 
Revenue.166 The Liquor Control Board in Washington sought to create a 
tightly regulated and controlled market for marijuana. One of the major 
highlights from the rules includes a three-tier regulatory system covering 
producers, processors, and retailers.167 In order to obtain a license on any 
level, applicants must be a resident of the state, go through extensive 
background checks, pay an application fee, abide by production 
limitations, submit to taxation, and carry liability insurance.168 
Unlicensed production and distribution remains a class C felony under 
state law.169 The Liquor Control Board has made a commendable attempt 
to design the rules in a way that supports public health and safety. A 
traceability system will be employed, violation standards will be 
adopted, and restrictions on advertising will be enforced.170 Businesses 
will also be required to take steps ensuring security and safety, such as 
installing alarm systems, placing warnings on packages and labels, and 
adhering to strict record-keeping requirements.171 The window to register 
for licenses is now closed, and retail stores are set to open sometime this 
spring. 
In the September 10, 2013, judicial committee hearing, the Sheriff of 
King County, Washington, John Urquhart, emphasized that what was 
happening in Washington was “not the Wild Wild West.”172 The state is 
“committed to continued collaboration with the DEA, FBI, and DOJ for 
robust enforcement”173 of the new drug laws. Sheriff Urquhart claimed 
he is a strong supporter of Initiative 502 because the people have spoken, 
and it is what the people want.174 After thirty-seven years as a police 
officer, twelve of which were spent as a narcotics detective, Urquhart 
testified that his experience has shown him that “the War on Drugs has 
been a failure,”175 and the citizens of Washington have decided “to try 
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something new.”176 Sheriff Urquhart may have a valid point regarding 
the failure of the “war on drugs.” 
V. THE DETRIMENTAL EFFECTS OF FEDERAL DRUG POLICY 
AND RECENT REFORM EFFORTS 
A. Mass Incarceration and Associated Costs 
The demand for, the potency of, and the exposure to drugs has only 
increased over the years. Beginning in the 1970s, with the rise of tough-
on-crime politics and the War on Drugs, America’s prison population has 
increased exponentially. The United States has had the highest 
incarceration rate in the world for over a decade.177 The war on 
marijuana in particular has been “waged at a tremendous cost of money 
and impact on human lives.”178 According to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), in 2011 there were over 1,500,000 arrests for drug-
related offenses, and approximately eighty-two percent (82%) of those 
were for possession.179 A vast majority of these arrests occur at the state 
and local level.180 “It has been estimated that enforcement of federal 
marijuana laws (including incarceration) costs a minimum of $5.5 billion 
dollars each year.”181 
Of course, these numbers are only estimates because it is practically 
impossible to calculate the number of people serving prison time for 
marijuana possession alone and the cost of their incarceration. 
Convictions for possession often result from the plea bargaining process. 
Also, whether incarceration follows from a conviction for possession of 
marijuana is influenced by many factors, such as quantity possessed, the 
geographic area, prior criminal record, and violations while on probation 
or parole.182 Calculating the total cost of incarceration related to 
marijuana possession is even more difficult. A major factor to consider is 
whether a person is incarcerated solely because of marijuana possession, 
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or whether that conviction is coupled with other offenses.183 
Additionally, not every person is sent to prison; many go to city or 
county jails and are held pending trial, sentencing, and arraignment, 
which accrue even more costs.184 
B. Discrimination, Collateral Consequences of Conviction, 
and For-Profit Prisons 
The war on marijuana has resulted in prison overcrowding, has been 
a substantial drain on federal, state, and local resources, and has been a 
cancer within society, disproportionately affecting racial minorities.185 
Patterns of discrimination can be found nationwide. According to the 
American Civil Liberties Union, black Americans are about 3.7 times 
more likely to be arrested for marijuana possession than white 
Americans, even though both races use marijuana at equally similar 
rates.186 The for-profit prison system may be one of the main reasons for 
this increasing trend of mass incarceration. These prison companies 
make contracts with the state, and enforce lockup quotas to guarantee 
that their “private prisons turn a profit.”187 If a state fails to incarcerate a 
certain amount of people and does not meet the quota obligation, it must 
pay these for-profit prisons for their empty beds.188 One might imagine 
that an effective way to guarantee occupancy requirements is to increase 
incarceration for drug-related offenses. 
Throughout the years, there has been an abundance of evidence 
suggesting that large-scale incarceration is not the most effective means 
of achieving public safety.189 “Few people still believe the lurid stories 
spread so widely during 1930s antimarijuana [sic] campaign. And yet 
marijuana remains a highly controversial subject in our society,”190 
masked with misinformation and uncertainty. Every year, thousands of 
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people’s lives are destroyed for simple possession,191 but the effects of 
mass incarceration are not confined to the cellblock. Both legal and 
social barriers exist long after a person has successfully completed their 
sentence. The collateral consequences of a conviction or an arrest can 
follow a former inmate for life. Society continues to demonize these 
individuals long after they have completed their court-imposed 
sentences. They carry the social stigma of being a “criminal” or a “felon” 
or a “convict,” and they are constantly regulated to second-class 
citizenship, where they are deprived of certain rights, their property is 
forfeited, and their financial and employment opportunities are 
negatively impacted. 
Mass incarceration and collateral consequences are the tragic results 
of the decades-old war on drugs. Legal substances like alcohol, tobacco, 
and prescription medication have well-documented detrimental effects 
on public health and safety.192 So why the animosity toward marijuana? 
Perhaps people are beginning to recognize that U.S. drug policy in regard 
to marijuana is both costly and futile at best, and that the system is 
broken. 
What some people fail to see, however, is that the system was never 
broken, it was built this way. That being said, there have recently been 
some positive steps signaling a shift in the nation’s approach to criminal 
justice, particularly illegal drugs. In mid-July 2014, the U.S. Sentencing 
Commission decided that nearly 50,000 federal drug offenders currently 
in prison are eligible for reduced sentences.193 Furthermore, state 
marijuana legalization initiatives are now emerging across the country, 
indicating a change in both political and social attitude and opinion. 
C. State and Local Initiatives 
Although faced with staunch opposition, many states are moving 
away from archaic policies, and modernizing their approach to the issue 
of legalized marijuana. Florida is one of those states. This Comment 
notes that Florida’s penalties for possessing small amounts of marijuana 
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are among the country’s most draconian. Despite this, Florida Governor 
Rick Scott signed the Compassionate Medical Cannabis Act (nicknamed 
the “Charlotte’s Web” bill) on June 16, 2014.194 The law allows for the 
limited use of medical marijuana with low levels of THC by patients who 
meet certain requirements.195 Through the initiative process, the Florida 
Right to Medical Marijuana Initiative, Amendment 2 is set to appear on 
the November 2014 ballot.196 The voter-approved measure would 
legalize medical marijuana in the state, specifically guaranteeing the 
following: 
- The medical use of marijuana by a qualifying 
patient or personal caregiver is not subject to criminal or 
civil liability or sanctions under Florida law except as 
provided in this section. 
- A physician licensed in Florida shall not be 
subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under 
Florida law for issuing a physician certification to a 
person diagnosed with a debilitating medical condition 
in a manner consistent with this section. 
- Actions and conduct by a medical marijuana 
treatment center registered with the Department, or its 
employees, as permitted by this section and in 
compliance with Department regulations, shall not be 
subject to criminal or civil liability or sanctions under 
Florida law except as provided in this section.197 
The measure also defines a “debilitating medical condition” as 
cancer, glaucoma, positive status for human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV), acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (AIDS), hepatitis C, amyotrophic 
lateral sclerosis (ALS), Crohn’s disease, Parkinson’s 
disease, multiple sclerosis or other conditions for which 
a physician believes that the medical use of marijuana 
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would likely outweigh the potential health risks for a 
patient.198 
The Florida Department of Health would be in charge of regulating 
production, distribution, and use of medical marijuana in the state.199 The 
department would issue identification cards to patients and personal 
caregivers, as well as develop procedures related to treatment centers.200 
Other state and local governments have also jumped aboard the 
marijuana legalization train, and are seeking to implement new marijuana 
legislation. Portland, Maine became the first east coast city to legalize 
recreational marijuana for adults twenty-one and older.201 Citizens in the 
Michigan cities of Lansing, Jackson, and Ferndale voted to allow the 
possession of up to an ounce of marijuana on private property.202 
Advocates are reportedly pushing for full commercial legalization of 
marijuana for recreational use in Alaska, which would then join 
Colorado and Washington to have such drug laws.203 Pro-recreational 
initiatives could be on the 2016 ballot in Oregon, and are expected to 
appear in Arizona, California, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, and 
Nevada.204 As of July 31, 2014, twenty-three states and the District of 
Colombia have enacted laws legalizing medical marijuana, the latest 
being New York and Maryland.205 Florida, Pennsylvania, North 
Carolina, and Ohio currently have pending legislation or ballot initiatives 
to legalize use of medical marijuana.206 
According to a Gallup poll taken in late October 2013, a majority of 
Americans, for the first time ever, believe that marijuana should be 
legalized in some form (the figure stands at fifty-eight percent (58%), a 
notable increase since Colorado and Washington voted for legalization 
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back in November 2012).207 The momentum is building, and the 
trajectory is unmistakably toward some form of legalization in most 
states. The structure and fate of these future initiatives and pending 
propositions depend in large part on the outcomes and successes in 
Colorado and Washington in the course of the next few years, as well as 
on the response of the federal government. For now, this transitory 
period is marked by a dependence on federal discretion, and the necessity 
to allocate limited investigative and prosecutorial resources. The future 
of this current policy of restraint, however, remains uncertain, as any 
shift in executive power after 2016 could unravel any progress made on 
legalization. 
VI. “CANNABUSINESS” AND ITS ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Legal marijuana presents numerous business opportunities to those 
seeking profit in the emergent industry. “This potentially explosive 
growth in the marijuana business will create large opportunities for 
investors [and all types of prospectors], but also an exponential increase 
in the number of people affected by the current web of overlapping and 
contradictory state and federal regulation[s].”208 As the industries for 
both medical and recreational marijuana use expand, more and more 
people find it increasingly difficult to determine where the line between 
permissible and impermissible conduct ought to be drawn. The reality of 
the situation is this: owning and operating licensed dispensaries, legal 
ventures under state law, are nonetheless subject to felony prosecutions 
and exist at the mercy of federal discretion. 
Professor Sam Kamin posits that Rule 1.2 from the Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct209 allows clients much needed access to lawyers in 
this complex and confusing area of conflicting law.210 Kamin argues that 
since the states are choosing to adopt laws contrary to the federal 
government by implementing regulatory systems to govern the marijuana 
industry within their borders, “access to law and lawyers becomes a 
necessary aspect of . . . this policy decision.”211 The current legal climate 
is in such a state of flux and confusion that this fundamental tenant of our 
society becomes more important than ever. If state laws create the 
regulatory scheme, within which clients are permitted to apply for 
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licenses, negotiate leasing agreements, offer employment contracts, and 
do all things necessary for a business to legally thrive, “denying [them] 
the assistance of counsel triggers questions of access to law, lawyers, and 
legal services.”212 
With the newly emerging marijuana business complicated by the fact 
that production, sale, possession, and use of the drug remains a federal 
crime, lawyers are forced to navigate an ethical labyrinth fraught with 
uncertainty as they counsel and assist their clientele. “Because all 
lawyers have an obligation not to knowingly assist criminal conduct”213 
pursuant to Rule 1.2, taking on marijuana-related business clients 
exposes them to ethical, criminal, and disciplinary consequences. In the 
realm of criminal law, Kamin looks to accomplice and coconspirator 
liability doctrines as guides in the first step of his analysis, and he draws 
a critical distinction between mere knowledge and requisite intent when 
providing legal services to these marijuana clients.214 Rule 1.2(d) of the 
Model Rules is then closely examined, along with its conflicting 
interpretations and Kamin’s proposed reading of it. With the ever-present 
threat of federal prosecution held at bay by only prosecutorial discretion 
and restraint, lawyers must tread carefully when representing clients in 
this newly budding business. 
According to Kamin, in order for a lawyer to be criminally liable for 
providing legal services to marijuana clients under either an accomplice 
or coconspirator theory of liability, the lawyer must possess the requisite 
intent, or mental state.215 An effective way of understanding this difficult 
concept is to try and determine whether the lawyer intentionally 
associates himself with a criminal venture or participates in such a way 
that his actions demonstrate a desire to make it succeed.216 In expounding 
on the distinction between a knowledge requirement and an intent 
standard, Kamin makes a relatively faulty analogy that he later admits is 
improper, but nonetheless helps to establish his idea. He equates a lawyer 
with a merchant, and notes that “a merchant is not liable for failing to 
take steps to keep her lawful goods or services from being misused”217 
by clients. This analogy later unravels because the attorney-client 
relationship is unique and incomparable to the relationship between a 
merchant and a customer. 
An attorney-client relationship more often than not requires the 
exchange of confidential communications and the disclosure of 
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information in order to advance the interests and objectives of the client, 
whereas a merchant-customer relationship does not, being more 
impersonal in nature. Kamin remarks that “it is intuitive to argue that the 
case for punishing knowing facilitation of a crime is stronger vis-à-vis 
lawyers than it is with regard to other merchants.”218 Yet, because the 
exchange of information and knowledge is more important in the 
attorney-client relationship, and because lawyers provide an often 
constitutionally based societal good,219 punishing them based on a mere 
knowledge basis severely undermines their purpose and effectiveness. 
Thus “a mens rea of true intent is an important protection against 
prosecutorial overreaching in the event of prosecution of marijuana 
lawyers”220 as either accomplices or coconspirators to violations of 
federal law. Although such prosecutions are rare, lawyers are still subject 
to criminal liability, but are more likely to face some form of 
professional discipline.221 
Legal rights exist to protect an individual’s autonomy, essential to 
human dignity. “Access to law and lawyers in a highly regulated society 
is fundamental to the informed exercise of autonomy by clients.”222 
Providing effective representation presupposes the ability to counsel and 
assist clients with their legal needs, even those with marijuana-related 
legal quandaries. Rule 1.2 outlines the scope of such representation, and 
paragraph (d) states that 
[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a 
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or 
fraudulent, but a lawyer may discuss the legal 
consequences of any proposed course of conduct with 
the client and may counsel or assist a client to make a 
good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, 
meaning or application of law.223 
Federal law makes the production, sale, and possession of marijuana a 
federal crime.224 If a client is looking to gain a foothold in the marijuana 
business by operating a dispensary, he is in violation of federal law. A 
lawyer called upon to counsel and assist the client in such conduct would 
seemingly have actual knowledge of his client’s criminal activity, thus 
violating Rule 1.2(d), which prohibits the lawyer from participating in 
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the commission of crime, regardless of whether the state permits such 
conduct.225 Kamin suggests that this plain reading of the Rule with a 
traditional interpretation is impractical, for such a mechanical approach 
precludes a lawyer “from drafting documents, representing the client, 
negotiating on her behalf, or offering any kind of [meaningful] legal 
services”226 related to the marijuana business, effectively denying the 
client access to the law. Whether such a plain reading can be dismissed 
so easily may well depend on the evolution of both law and societal 
ethos as it relates to marijuana use and its perceived economic benefits. 
Indeed, the argument has been made that counseling clients on how 
to avoid federal prosecution for marijuana-related offenses using state 
laws as a shield contravenes the purpose of Rule 1.2.227 Many believe 
that the legal advice given should not go beyond explaining legal 
consequences for certain conduct, and determining the “validity, scope, 
meaning, or application of the law.”228 In 2010, the Maine Ethics 
Commission released an opinion regarding the ethical dilemma lawyers 
might face aiding medical marijuana clients.229 The Commission 
proponed a cautionary approach, warning lawyers that “participation in 
this endeavor . . . involves a significant degree of risk which needs to be 
carefully evaluated,”230 and a determination must be made as to “whether 
the particular legal service being requested rises to the level of assistance 
in violating federal law.”231 If so, such conduct may represent an ethical 
breach. On the other hand, the Arizona Bar Ethics Committee released a 
similar opinion the following year, but came to a vastly different 
conclusion.232 The Arizona Committee declined 
to interpret and apply [Rule 1.2] in a manner that would 
prevent a lawyer who concludes that the client’s 
proposed conduct is in “clear and unambiguous 
compliance” with state law from assisting the client in 
connection with activities expressly authorized under 
state law, thereby depriving clients of the very legal 
advice and assistance that is needed to engage in the 
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conduct that the state law expressly permits. The 
maintenance of an independent legal profession, and of 
its right to advocate for the interests of clients, is a 
bulwark of our system of government.233 
The contradiction between these two opinions at first glance seems 
insurmountable. Maine stresses extreme caution in response to federal 
prohibition, while Arizona seeks to carve out an area for lawyers to 
ethically represent marijuana clients within the context of state law. This 
dichotomy exemplifies the difficulties attorneys have to face, as distinct 
state landscapes lead to divergent interpretations of the ramifications 
federal law has on the sphere of legal ethics. In order to bridge the gap 
between these two conflicting opinions, Kamin relies on his criminal law 
distinction approach, discussed earlier, between mere knowledge and 
true intent, which he believes will provide some level of stability for 
lawyers bemused by the ethical challenges.234 
Kamin’s use of true intent, however, takes on an amorphous quality 
as he lays out distinctions in an attempt to define its scope and function. 
The distinctions he makes between different criminal acts, state and 
federal venues, criminal courts and professional disciplinary hearings, all 
tend to make “intent” within a particular setting murky at best. Lawyers 
require some level of certainty to effectively represent their clients, 
especially in the business world. However, with the fluid status of the 
state-federal tension, lawyers may just have to cope with speculative 
analysis and some ambiguities for the time being. Kamin’s ingenious 
analysis attempts to forge clarity, and succeeds to the extent possible in 
coming to grips with this complex ethical quandary. One distinction 
Kamin emphasizes is when dealing with mala in se crimes, such as 
murder, rape, robbery, and assault, as opposed to mala prohibitia 
crimes—deemed crimes merely because they are prohibited (for 
example, violations of the Controlled Substances Act).235 In relation to 
mala in se crimes, Kamin believes that a mere knowledge requirement on 
the part of lawyers may be more justified to hold them liable for certain 
conduct.236 On the other hand, mala prohibita crimes do not warrant such 
limited access and “strong policy reasons support the reading of an intent 
requirement into Rule 1.2(d).”237 Production, possession, use, and sale of 
marijuana would fall under the category of mala prohibita crimes, thus 
Kamin argues “that an intent to facilitate such behavior is necessary in 
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order for an attorney to be deemed to have engaged in unethical or 
criminal conduct.”238 
Whether a lawyer always forms an intent, in the legal sense, to help 
their clients is a critical question.239 Rule 1.2(b) reminds us that “a 
lawyer’s representation of a client . . . does not constitute an endorsement 
of the client’s political, economic, social, or moral views or activities.”240 
Yet, one could argue that the ability to effectively represent a client 
depends upon an understanding of that client’s activities, which could 
form the requisite intent and trigger a violation of Rule 1.2(d). 
Throughout this ongoing process of change, however, more questions are 
raised than answers provided, but according to Kamin, so long as a 
lawyer provides the same services and issues the same charges to 
marijuana clients that she does to the rest of her business clientele,241 and 
does not form the requisite intent read into Rule 1.2(d),242 then that 
lawyer acts ethically and is permitted to provide competent legal 
representation and assistance. This type of definite fixing of ethical 
clarity is the main driving force behind Kamin’s exhaustive Article. 
VII.  TAXATION ISSUES AND THE ROLE OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT 
Apart from possible ethical concerns, some federal laws, particularly 
in the area of taxation, pose other challenges to lawyers and create 
significant obstacles to the success of these marijuana industries. As 
noted by several of the speakers in the September 10th, 2013, Senate 
Judicial Committee hearing, Section 280E of the Internal Revenue Code 
prohibits a taxpayer from claiming a federal income tax deduction for a 
“business considered to be trafficking substances under the Controlled 
Substances Act . . . .Section 280E effectively bars legal marijuana 
businesses operating in Colorado [and other states] from claiming the 
types of business expense deductions that other legal businesses can 
claim.”243 In response, Colorado has enacted legislation that gives both 
medical and recreational marijuana enterprises the ability to deduct 
business expenses from their state income tax returns, even though 
Section 280E bars such action at the federal level.244 Advocates in 
Colorado are joined by others from several states in urging Congress to 
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revise the federal tax code, so that it would allow for marijuana 
businesses to claim such deductions.245 
There have also been novel interpretations of current federal tax law 
that attempt to avoid the impact of Section 280E. One recent Article 
proposes a resolution to the problem by recasting the marijuana industry 
in the guise of community based “economic development corporations” 
that promote social welfare.246 This would enable these businesses to 
qualify for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(4) of the federal tax 
code.247 According to the author, some of the federalism concerns would 
be resolved, specifically in the area of tax law.248 Under his scheme, 
federal taxation issues would yield to a genuinely new vision of the 
emerging marijuana industry. This Comment believes, however, given 
the economic realities and expectations inherent in the growing legal 
marijuana market, that this reconfiguring of the new industry probably 
dissipates in the face of the capitalist imperative to generate revenue and 
maximize profits. The current tax issue, coupled with the unwillingness 
of banks and credit card companies to back the marijuana industry, has 
made it exceedingly difficult for these businesses to function and 
succeed. 
Sophisticated and unsophisticated clients alike may struggle to 
comprehend the conflicting and complex marijuana regimes of both the 
state and federal government, turning to lawyers for sound advice and 
clear guidance.249 The taxation problem not only deprives marijuana 
businesses from enjoying the deductions that other legitimate businesses 
enjoy, but filing federal income taxes potentially invites the federal 
government to exercise its discretion and enforce federal drug policy. In 
this context, the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination is 
implicated. The relevant language states that “no person . . . shall be 
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”250 When 
filing a federal tax return, how should a marijuana business describe their 
business activity, or indicate what kind of product or service they 
provide? Pursuant to the Internal Revenue Code, returns or return 
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information may be disclosed for use in criminal investigations.251 With 
Colorado and Washington dispensaries now manufacturing and selling 
recreational marijuana, is it only a matter of time before the federal 
government kicks down their doors, armed with tax records indicating 
conduct in violation of the Controlled Substances Act? The likely answer 
is no. 
As a general proposition, “Fifth Amendment jurisprudence does not 
allow the privilege against self-incrimination to be invoked in order to 
avoid generally applicable reporting requirements that do not target 
inherently suspect activities.”252 Many federal and state statutes require 
individuals to submit documents containing information that may prove 
self-incriminating, but this does not make them unconstitutional per se. 
Generally as a threshold issue, the Fifth Amendment privilege only 
comes into play if there is a real and substantial threat of prosecution and 
risk of self-incrimination.253 The production and sale of marijuana for 
any purpose, medicinal or recreational, constitutes a federal crime. 
Although the Department of Justice’s August 29, 2013, memorandum 
instructs federal prosecutors throughout the country to exercise their 
prosecutorial discretion and direct their use of limited resources to 
address the most significant threats, the memorandum is careful to 
reserve the federal government’s right to enforce federal law, even in the 
absence of any one of the listed enforcement priorities.254 Under the 
Controlled Substances Act, marijuana dispensaries face a real and 
appreciable risk of prosecution subject only to federal discretion and 
restraint.255 Thus it appears that the “merits of a Fifth Amendment 
defense to the tax filing requirement”256 warrants closer examination. 
In a pithy opinion published in 1927, the Supreme Court in United 
States v. Sullivan upheld a conviction when a defendant failed to file an 
income tax return.257 The Court noted that “[i]t would be an extreme if 
not extravagant application of the Fifth Amendment to say that it 
authorized a man to refuse to state the amount of his income because it 
had been made in crime.”258 A few years later in Garner v. United States, 
the Court refused to find that the use of a tax statement violated 
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defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege.259 Courts since have analyzed 
the issue with the presumption that a “statutory reporting requirement is 
essential to a public, regulatory scheme, rather than designed to obtain 
private information or evidence of criminal activity.”260 Thus, a company 
answering a generally innocent question on a tax return form, such as 
indicating what product or service the business provides, cannot be said 
to have been compelled within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment.261 
A federal income tax return may pose a real and appreciable risk of 
self-incrimination, but it is not designed to compel the disclosure of 
testimonial information that would bring it within the purview of the 
Fifth Amendment. The information generally disclosed in the filing of 
such a tax statement is essentially considered a “noncriminal and 
regulatory area of inquiry.”262 Marijuana dispensaries are basically 
considered to be retail stores engaged in the activity of “selling tangible 
personal property at retail . . . [and] can hardly be characterized as a 
selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities.”263 
The case of California v. Byers delivers an enlightening summary 
that provides some clarity on the taxation issue and the role of the Fifth 
Amendment: 
An organized society imposes many burdens on its 
constituents. It commands the filing of tax returns for 
income; it requires producers and distributors of 
consumer goods to file informational reports on the 
manufacturing process and the content of products, on 
the wages, hours, and working conditions of employees. 
Those who borrow money on the public market or issue 
securities for sale to the public must file various 
information reports; industries must report periodically 
the volume and content of pollutants discharged into our 
waters and atmosphere . . . . 
In each of these situations there is some possibility of 
prosecution—often a very real one—for criminal 
offenses disclosed by or deriving from the information 
that the law compels a person to supply . . . .But under 
our holdings the mere possibility of incrimination is 
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insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor of 
disclosure called for by [federal] statutes.264 
Following the majority, Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Byers 
articulates this policy approach.265 In balancing the state’s interests 
against those of the individual, Harlan contends that the “assertedly non-
criminal governmental purpose in securing information, the necessity for 
self-reporting as a means of securing the information, and the nature of 
the disclosure required”266 effectively estops a defendant from raising a 
valid Fifth Amendment defense “to a generally applicable requirement to 
report sales revenues and remit sales tax.”267 Whether Harlan’s reasoning 
waters down constitutional guarantees is open for debate. Regardless, the 
key consideration to address in this potentially problematic area is 
whether the taxation scheme (in this case the federal income tax return) 
“is designed to facilitate the government’s legitimate needs for 
regulatory information rather than undercut the adversary system by 
covertly aiding the investigation and prosecution of crime.”268 Thus far, 
the former inference has prevailed; but with much change on the 
marijuana legalization horizon, it is difficult to determine what the future 
might hold. Will this seemingly well-settled area of law remain resolute, 
or will legalized marijuana force it to evolve and adapt as this movement 
gains momentum? 
 
VIII. FUTURE MUSINGS 
There has been an undeniable shift in the United States regarding 
marijuana legalization. The topic has fluttered in and out of national 
conversation and debate for almost a century, and according to recent 
opinion polls, public perceptions about the drug have come a long way. 
History has shown time and time again that progress is a powerful and 
ultimately inevitable force. Prohibition has been a “blunt” tool before, 
and was shown to be ineffective. Nationwide prohibition of alcohol 
began in 1920 with the ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.269 
Despite prohibitionist efforts, alcohol consumption continued to rise in 
several areas of the country, and organized crime increased in an effort to 
produce and distribute the highly demanded product. A “disconnect 
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between strong official condemnation and widespread popular 
acceptance led to the failure of Prohibition,”270 and the Twenty-First 
Amendment was passed, repealing the ban on alcohol.271 Scholars, 
however, point to an inherent difference between alcohol and marijuana, 
noting that history, custom, and practicality played a vital role because 
“centuries of tradition and decades of marketing . . . left alcohol use a 
deeply ingrained feature” of our societal psyche.272 Marijuana, on the 
other hand, is not as equally entrenched . . . at least, not yet.273 
With so much ongoing change, and more guaranteed to come, many 
people speculate on what the future holds. Marijuana advocates are 
constantly trying to decriminalize marijuana at both the state and federal 
level and ignite reform. Legislative bills like the Ending Federal 
Marijuana Prohibition Act274 and the Respect State Marijuana Laws 
Act275 have been presented to Congress as part of the decriminalization 
effort. 
On July 28, 2014, the Charlotte’s Web Medical Hemp Act was 
introduced in the House of Representatives.276 This bipartisan bill seeks 
to amend the Controlled Substances Act by excluding “therapeutic 
hemp” and “cannabidiol” from the definition of marijuana.277 
Furthermore, a bipartisan coalition of House members voted on an 
appropriations amendment that seeks to restrict the DEA from utilizing 
funds “to prevent such States from implementing their own State laws 
that authorize the use, distribution, possession, or cultivation of medical 
marijuana.”278 Advocate groups have also attempted to reschedule 
marijuana by navigating the alternative route of judicial review. In 
October 2002, Americans for Safe Access, the Coalition to Reschedule 
Cannabis, and Patients Out of Time petitioned the DEA to reschedule 
marijuana as a Schedule III, IV, or V drug. Nine years later, in July 2011, 
the DEA denied the petition. The petitioners subsequently filed for a 
timely review of the DEA’s action. Unfortunately in January 2013, the 
United States Court of Appeals in the District of Colombia Circuit struck 
down the petition to reschedule the drug in Ams. for Safe Access v. Drug 
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Enforcement Admin.279 The Court held that there was substantial 
evidence supporting the DEA’s findings that no adequate and well-
controlled studies have established any currently accepted medical uses 
for marijuana.280 A future determination as to the federal-state law 
conflict issue could clear the air of uncertainty surrounding many topics 
of concern. 
With “any potential conflict between state and federal authority, . . . 
lawyers have a critical role to perform in the activities that will lead to 
the proper resolution of the controversy.”281 The legal profession is 
comprised of individuals endlessly “pursing a learned art as a common 
calling in the spirit of public service.”282 This “calling” encourages 
lawyers to represent their clients without fear and to the fullest extent 
possible, although it is necessarily bound by ethical and legal constraints, 
which may sometimes dictate a cautionary approach. 
Significant obstacles still lie ahead for the marijuana legalization 
movement,283 and lawyers will continue to work on resolving such 
issues. Present and future state implementation and regulation efforts 
remain hindered by current uncertainty connected with the fluid state of 
federal banking regulations. If forced to be cash-only enterprises, 
marijuana dispensaries will continue to be targets for criminal activity. 
Banks and credit companies may still be hesitant to do business with 
marijuana industries while federal enforcement remains unpredictable in 
the absence of new congressional legislation. On top of such frustration, 
these businesses cannot claim the tax deductions that other legitimate 
businesses enjoy. Now although the invocation of the Fifth Amendment 
in regard to federal tax returns has been considered generally ineffective, 
in the context of the rising recreational marijuana industry, the 
Amendment poignantly highlights a growing constitutional uneasiness 
that must soon be addressed. 
Marijuana use will continue to increase—whether for medical or 
recreational purposes—and the confusion and conflict over the current 
legalization movement will eventually prompt federal action because 
“when it comes to the overlapping regulation of marijuana in the United 
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States, the status quo is clearly untenable.”284 The federal government 
may elect to respond in a manner of different ways.285 It could attempt to 
(1) sue to invalidate the state laws under the Supremacy 
Clause and to enjoin state authorities from issuing 
licenses to marijuana growers and sellers; (2) use 
injunctions, threats of asset forfeiture, or criminal 
prosecution to shut down state-licensed marijuana 
businesses; (3) unilaterally establish a set of enforcement 
priorities to de-emphasize attacks on state-legal 
businesses; or (4) enter into cooperative enforcement 
agreements with the states that could implicitly allow 
state-regulated systems to function, though without 
making them legal under federal law.286 
Under the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence however, “the 
federal government is prohibited from commandeering the state 
legislatures or state executive officials by mandating that states enact 
certain legislation or implement or enforce a federal law.”287 The 
preemptive language in the Controlled Substances Act limits Congress’ 
power to compel the states to enforce its provisions, and gives leeway to 
the states to pass marijuana-related legislation so long as a “positive 
conflict” is not created. Thus far, states have taken advantage of this, 
steadily increasing their control over the production, possession, sale, 
and use of marijuana within their borders. Now, the federal government 
most likely cannot direct the states to completely prohibit marijuana or 
repeal their existing exemptions and regulations, but they may be able to 
elicit support for federal policy among the states by directing monetary 
incentives in the form of federal funds in return for cooperation to further 
a federal interest (for example, state legislation consistent with the 
Controlled Substances Act.288 As far as option (2) is concerned (see 
above), limited investigative and prosecutorial resources already hamper 
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drug enforcement, and have already led to options (3) and (4) taking 
effect. The August 29, 2013, DOJ memorandum established a set of 
enforcement priorities to guide federal prosecutors across the country in 
the allocation of their resources. The memorandum also developed the 
expectation that state and local governments will enact and enforce 
strong and effective regulatory systems that promote the enumerated 
federal interests.289 This reliance is an important step in the development 
of cooperative enforcement efforts. 
Such an alliance could yield several potential advantages. Federal, 
state, and local governments can lend a hand in shaping the marijuana 
industry and benefit from its success; such a joint effort and pooling of 
resources could focus enforcement on more significant concerns. If 
marijuana was to be declassified as a Schedule I drug, and the federal 
government implemented regulatory and taxation systems similar to 
those in place for alcohol and tobacco, the resulting revenue could help 
reduce the national debt, allow for reallocation of law enforcement 
resources, and fund education and medical studies.290 This new kind of 
regulatory framework, bound by principles of common sense and clear 
priorities, could enhance individual freedom, while at the same time, 
further the important goal of public safety. Lawyers will play an 
important part in formulating and implementing such a legalization 
regime, which will encompass both law enforcement and the regulation 
of the new marijuana industry. Such a movement will certainly pose 
practical obstacles and ethical dilemmas for legal practitioners, made 
more difficult by having to adapt to the fluid state of the law. Serious 
thought should be given to these issues now before the increasing 
momentum for legalization forces haphazard responses and empty 
rhetorical flourishes. Whatever the case may be, the prospect of some 
federal action seems inevitable. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The social, political, and economic implications of this pro-
marijuana movement are difficult to anticipate. How might legalization 
affect past, present, and future drug violations, incarceration rates, 
allocation of state and federal resources, and use and dependence among 
society? Answers remain unclear, for even the wisest cannot foresee all 
ends. The efforts of Colorado and Washington will be like the falling of 
small stones that start an avalanche of change. Something has begun. 
Amendment 64 and Initiative 502 have come to embody an expression of 
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state sovereignty, a manifestation of individual liberty, and an 
opportunity to be a part of a potentially multi-billion dollar “green rush.” 
Have these steps toward legalization been part of a smarter, more 
common-sense approach? Or will Kevin Sabet’s cautionary closing 
declaration come to fruition—”would we open the floodgates, hope for 
the best, and try with limited resources to patch everything up when 
things go wrong?”291 Only time will tell. 
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